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This article tells how the world achieved a working consensus on the core principles of monetary policy.
The story begins with the muddled state of affairs in the late 1970s. It then asks: How did Federal
Reserve policy produce an understanding of the practical principles of monetary policy? How did
formal institutional support abroad for targeting low inflation follow from an international acceptance
of these ideas? And how did a consensus theoretical model develop in academia? The article tells how
the modern theoretical consensus known as the New Neoclassical Synthesis (aka, the New Keynesian
model) reinforces key advances: the priority for price stability, the targeting of core rather than headline
inflation, the importance of credibility for low inflation, and preemptive interest rate policy supported
by transparent objectives and procedures. The conclusion identifies important practical issues that
remain to be explored in theory.
Marvin Goodfriend





marvingd@andrew.cmu.edu  In the 1970s, monetary policy was in disarray. The situation in the United States 
was typical: inflation peaked above 10 percent in 1974 and again in 1980. Many central 
bankers were pessimistic about the power of monetary policy to reduce inflation, at least 
at any politically acceptable cost (Burns, 1979). A survey of six then-recent empirically 
estimated short-run Phillips curves by Okun (1978) suggested that the Federal Reserve 
would need to precipitate a 10 percent contraction of employment and output in the 
United States for one year for each permanent percentage point reduction of inflation that 
it wished to achieve. In other words, it appeared that it could take a modern Great 
Depression—a 10 percent contraction of output and employment sustained for almost 10 
years—to achieve price stability. Even then, there was no guarantee that inflation would 
not begin to move higher again once restrictive monetary policy was relaxed.  
  The arrival of Paul Volcker as chairman of the Federal Reserve in 1979 stands as 
a turning point. The Volcker Fed brought the inflation rate down to 4 percent by 1984, 
although it precipitated recessions in 1980 and 1981–82 to do so. Under Alan Greenspan, 
the Fed gradually worked the inflation rate down by the early 2000s below 2 percent, a 
range that Greenspan (2003) dubbed “effective price stability.”   
  The improved inflationary picture in the United States was accompanied by 
parallel developments around the world. Average inflation worldwide declined from 14 
percent in the early 1980s to 4 percent in the early 2000s (Rogoff, 2003).
1 Industrial 
economies achieved a reduction in inflation from 9 to 2 percent, while developing 
economies brought inflation down from 31 to 6 percent.  
                                                 
1 Rogoff (2003) reports that global inflation climbed in the first half of the 1990s and peaked at around 30 
percent due to temporarily high inflation in the developing world, particularly, in transition economies.  
  1  Moreover, during the quarter century or so that inflation has been stabilized, the 
United States experienced two of its longest economic expansions and two of its mildest 
recessions in 1990–91 and 2001. In comparison, the United States experienced six 
recessions in the 30 years from 1955 to 1985, culminating in the most severe U.S. 
recession since the 1930s in 1981–82. The “great moderation” of output volatility 
occurred worldwide. The volatility of annual output growth for OECD countries—for 
example, as measured by decade-long standard deviations of annual output growth—has 
fallen dramatically in the 1990s and 2000s relative to the 1970s (Rogoff, forthcoming). 
Stock and Watson (2003) attribute 20 to 30 percent of reduced GDP volatility in the 
United States to improved monetary policy and the rest to good luck in the form of 
smaller shocks to productivity and commodity prices, and unexplained declines in the 
volatility of residential investment, nonresidential construction, and durable goods 
production. Of course, better monetary policy may be responsible indirectly for what 
appears to be good luck, as Bernanke (2004) argues.  
  This article tells how the world achieved a working consensus on the core 
principles of monetary policy by the late 1990s. The story begins with a description of the 
muddled state of affairs in the 1970s and follows with three sections that ask: What 
happened in Federal Reserve policy to produce an understanding of the practical 
principles of monetary policy? How did formal institutional support for targeting low 
inflation abroad follow from an international acceptance of these ideas? And how did a 
consensus theoretical model develop in academia? The article then turns to how the 
modern theoretical consensus—known alternatively as the New Neoclassical Synthesis or 
the New Keynesian model of monetary policy—reinforces key advances: the priority for 
  2price stability; the targeting of core rather than headline inflation; the importance of 
credibility for low inflation; and preemptive interest rate policy supported by transparent 
objectives and procedures. Of course, a working consensus does not constitute complete 
agreement, and there is ample room for disagreement about various important issues 
regarding monetary policy. Accordingly, the conclusion identifies important issues that 
remain to be explored.  
 
Practical and Theoretical Disarray in the 1970s 
 
  At the heart of the disarray in monetary policy practice in the 1970s was the 
tendency for a central bank like the Federal Reserve to pursue “go-stop” monetary policy. 
Go-stop policy was a consequence of a central bank’s inclination to be responsive to the 
shifting balance of public concerns between inflation and unemployment. The central 
bank would stimulate employment in the "go" phase of the cycle until the public became 
concerned about rising inflation. Then aggressive interest rate policy initiated the "stop" 
phase of the policy cycle to bring inflation down, while unemployment rates moved 
higher with a lag. Public support for interest rate increases evaporated once the 
unemployment rate began to rise, so it was politically difficult to reverse a higher 
inflation rate.
2 
  Wage and price setters learned to take advantage of tight labor and product 
markets in the "go" phase of the policy cycle to make increasingly inflationary demands, 
                                                 
2 Milton Friedman (1964) discussed the go-stop character of Federal Reserve policy. Romer and Romer 
(1989) documented six occasions on which the Federal Reserve tightened monetary policy decisively to 
fight inflation, all of which were followed by sharply rising unemployment. King (2005) discusses go-stop 
policy in the United Kingdom. See Batini and Nelson (2005) for a history of UK monetary policy from 
1955 to 2004.  
  3which neutralized the monetary stimulus. As a result, central banks became ever more 
expansionary in the pursuit of low unemployment. Lenders demanded ever-higher 
inflation premia in bond rates which moved higher and fluctuated widely. By pursuing 
low unemployment and fighting inflation only when it became the predominant public 
concern, central banks then increased the volatility of both inflation and output.  
   Other factors contributed to the disarray in monetary policy in the 1970s. In the 
1960s, the widespread belief in a long-run Phillips curve trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment inclined central banks to allow inflation to drift upward in the hope of 
achieving a permanently lower level of unemployment. Also, the productivity growth 
slowdown of the 1970s caused central banks like the Federal Reserve to overestimate 
noninflationary potential output (Orphanides, 2003). Oil price shocks that occurred in 
1973-74 and 1979–80 worsened the inflation problem, although neither of the oil price 
shocks produced the 3 percentage point increase in U.S. inflation that occurred in the 18 
months prior to Paul Volcker becoming Fed chairman in August 1979.  
   The disarray was further reflected in the collapse of political institutions that had 
served as the foundation of the international monetary system. Under the Bretton Woods 
system of fixed exchange rates established after World War II, countries around the 
world agreed to fix their exchange rates to the dollar, and the United States agreed to 
maintain convertibility of the dollar into gold at $35 an ounce. Increasingly inflationary 
go-stop policy in the United States was incompatible with the maintenance of gold 
convertibility. The fixed exchange rate system limped along and finally collapsed 
  4completely in 1971–1973 when the world’s major currencies introduced a permanent 
float against the dollar and the United States severed the dollar’s link to gold.
 3  
  With the collapse of Bretton Woods, for the first time in modern history, all the 
world’s major currencies were de-linked from gold or any other commodity. The lack of 
any formal constraint on money creation contributed to the nervousness about inflation. 
In the United States, an attempt to provide a new legislative framework for monetary 
policy fell short. The U.S. Congress enacted the Humphrey–Hawkins Full Employment 
Law in October 1978, which set national goals of 4 percent unemployment and 3 percent 
inflation to be achieved by 1983 with a further reduction to zero inflation by 1988. 
However, the law specified that the reduction in inflation was not to impede the reduction 
in unemployment, and it authorized no programs to achieve its objectives. It is no 
coincidence that shortly thereafter the dollar suffered a dramatic collapse on the foreign 
exchange market that precipitated an unprecedented rescue package on November 1, 
1978.  
  The disarray in monetary policy practice was reflected in deep divisions within 
the academic world. These divisions involved two key questions. First, did a central bank 
have the power to control inflation? Second, could central bank credibility influence 
inflation expectations? And how would the interaction between the two determine the 
costs of disinflation? 
  Well into the 1970s, there was widespread skepticism that monetary policy alone 
could control inflation. Even the head of the Federal Reserve from 1970 to 1978, Arthur 
Burns, was pessimistic (Burns, 1979; Hetzel, 1998) Inflation was commonly believed to 
be driven primarily by factors other than monetary policy: fiscal deficits, commodity 
                                                 
3 The forthcoming second volume of Allan Meltzer's history of the Federal Reserve tells this story in detail.  
  5price shocks, inflation psychology, aggressive labor unions, or monopolistically 
competitive firms.  
  Monetarist economists led by Milton Friedman, Karl Brunner, and Allan Meltzer 
worked beginning in the 1960s to show that a central bank had the monetary policy tools 
to act decisively against inflation. They did so in three ways: First, monetarists assembled 
international evidence that even if short-term inflation can be affected by many factors, 
long-term sustained inflation is always associated with excessive money growth. Second, 
they developed the theory of money demand and supporting econometric evidence to 
show that control of money is both necessary and sufficient to control the trend rate of 
inflation. Third, they argued that a central bank could exercise sufficient control over 
money to control inflation through its monopoly on currency and bank reserves, even if 
fluctuations in the demand for money were hard to predict. These arguments may now 
seem self-evident, but they were highly controversial at the time.  
  Macroeconomists had long realized that inflation expectations play a central role 
in propagating wage and price inflation. However, they divided sharply over whether 
monetary policy could manage inflation expectations in practice. For example, leading 
Keynesian economist James Tobin (1980, p. 64) thought that “the price- and wage-setting 
institutions of the economy have an inflationary bias.
 Consequently, demand management 
cannot stabilize the price trend without chronic sacrifice of output and employment 
unless assisted, occasionally or permanently, by direct incomes policies of some kind.”  
  On the other side, rational expectations monetary theory explored the link 
between “inflation psychology” and monetary policy. Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent 
showed that in theory, inflation expectations could be made to conform to a central 
  6bank’s desired low rate of inflation if a central bank was credibly committed to following 
a noninflationary money growth rule (Lucas, 1976; Lucas and Sargent, 1981). In a 
credible disinflation, money growth, expected inflation, and actual inflation could all 
slow together with little adverse effect on employment. In a noncredible disinflation, 
wage and price inflation would continue as before, and the public would drive interest 
rates and unemployment up as it competed for increasingly scarce real money balances.  
  The question was whether and how soon a central bank could acquire credibility 
for a transition to low inflation. On one side, Keynesians like Tobin (or Okun, as 
mentioned earlier) tended to believe that credibility would be hard to acquire, inflationary 
expectations would be slow to change, and the costs of disinflation would be high. 
Monetarists were divided over how readily a central bank could acquire credibility for 
low inflation. Kydland and Prescott (1977) showed that optimal monetary policy was not 
“time consistent,” meaning that a central bank free to make policy choices on a 
discretionary basis had an incentive to promise to pursue low inflation, and then to run an 
expansionary monetary policy aimed at lower unemployment, unless that promise was 
backed by a credible “commitment mechanism.” It appeared that central bank 
independence alone was not enough to overcome the commitment problem: after all, the 
Federal Reserve had long been an independent central bank. Kydland and Prescott’s logic 
suggested that a central bank might be foolish to attempt a disinflation without a 
legislative mandate for low inflation, because it might be unable to acquire the credibility 
needed for the disinflation to succeed.  
  Most monetarists acknowledged that the short-run unemployment costs of 
deliberate disinflation would be substantial. But they believed that determined 
  7disinflationary monetary policy could reduce expected inflation relatively quickly, so that 
the costs of disinflation would be much lower than commonly believed. This academic 
controversy would soon be resolved by empirical evidence that Paul Volcker was to 
provide as leader of the Federal Reserve.  
 
Federal Reserve Contributions to Monetary Policy Practice  
 
  When Paul Volcker became Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in August 
1979, he was determined to take aggressive action against inflation. After a severe crisis 
of confidence in commodity markets, on October 6, 1979, the Fed broke sharply with its 
tradition of saying little in public about its actions and grabbed the headlines with a 
dramatic, high-profile announcement that it planned to place greater emphasis on 
controlling money to fight inflation (Lindsey, Orphanides, and Rasche, 2005). By 
associating itself more closely with key monetarist ideas, the Volcker Fed implicitly took 
responsibility for inflation and created an expectation that the Fed was willing to let 
short-term interest rates rise dramatically to bring inflation down (Volcker, 1978).  
  After letting the federal funds rate rise by 3 percentage points in the fall of 1979, 
the Fed paused in its tightening as evidence accumulated that the U.S. economy was 
moving into recession. Then, in January and February 1980, the 30-year government 
bond rate jumped by 2 percentage points despite a weakening economy, reflecting an 
unprecedented "inflation scare" in the bond market. This 2 percentage point jump in 
inflation expectations had a number of contributing causes: the spike in underlying 
inflation in connection with the ongoing oil price shock, the run-up in the dollar price of 
  8gold to $850 per ounce in January, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In addition, 
the Fed's hesitation to tighten monetary policy further in light of the looming recession 
probably contributed to the inflation scare (Goodfriend, 1993). The inflation scare forced 
the Fed to choose between fighting unemployment and fighting inflation; it had 
effectively lost “room to maneuver” between go and stop policy. 
  The Federal Reserve reacted aggressively—letting the federal funds rate rise by 
another 3 percentage points to 17 percent in March 1980 alone! Real GDP declined at an 
extraordinary 10 percent annual rate in the second quarter of 1980 in response to the 
monetary tightening, in conjunction with the unfortunate imposition of credit controls 
(Schreft, 1990). The recession ended quickly with the lifting of credit controls in June 
1980 and an aggressive easing of monetary policy that brought the federal funds rate 
down to 8 percent by July. Real GDP growth bounced back in the fourth quarter of 1980.  
  In retrospect, 1980 was a disaster from a monetary policy point of view. The U.S. 
economy suffered a recession along with a destabilizing inflation scare and policy 
reaction, and yet at the end of the year, inflation remained above 10 percent. The events 
of 1980 heightened public unhappiness with inflation. Public support for inflation control 
and the support of the incoming Reagan administration encouraged the Volcker Fed to 
seize the window of opportunity that presented itself during the strong rebound in the 
second half of 1980 to move the federal funds rate up to 19 percent by early 1981. With a 
19 percent nominal funds rate, and a historically high 9 percent real funds rate (the 
historical average is 1 to 2 percent), the Fed was positioned to let the economy disinflate 
without having to tighten interest rates further as the unemployment rate began to rise. 
  9  Nonetheless, the bond market experienced a second inflation scare in 1981. In 
spite of extraordinarily tight monetary policy, the 30-year bond rate actually rose by 3 
percentage points from January to October 1981 even as the economy weakened, 
reflecting another 3 percentage point increase in inflation expectations. However, as the 
U.S. economy entered another recession in July 1981, the Fed responded differently than 
it had in early 1980. Volcker explained why at the July 1981 Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) meeting (Federal Open Market Committee, 1981, p. 36):  
 
I haven’t much doubt in my mind that it’s appropriate . . . to take the risk of more 
softness in the economy in the short run than we might ideally like in order to 
capitalize on the anti-inflationary momentum . . . That is much more likely to give 
a more satisfactory economic as well as inflationary outlook over a period of time 
as compared to the opposite scenario of heading off . . . sluggishness or even a 
downturn at the expense of rapidly getting back into the kind of situation we were 
in last fall where we had some retreat on inflationary psychology . . . Then we 
would look forward to another prolonged period of high interest rates and strain 
and face the same dilemmas over and over again. 
 
  The second inflation scare was pivotal because it convinced the Fed to pursue 
deliberate disinflation in 1981–82 rather than face costly inflation scares and associated 
recessions in the future by failing to bring inflation down. Thus, the Volcker Fed 
persisted with extraordinarily tight monetary policy even as the recession deepened.
4 The 
                                                 
4 Effective M1 grew around 4.6 percentage points slower in 1981 than its average annual growth over the 
preceding four years, actually undershooting its target range in 1981 (Broaddus and Goodfriend, 1984). 
  10inflation break came surprisingly fast; inflation fell to 5 percent by the first quarter of 
1982. But the Fed persisted with a 9 percent real federal funds rate until the interest rate 
on long-term bonds began to fall from its peak of 14 percent in the summer of 1982, 
indicating that the Fed had begun to acquire credibility for its disinflation.
5 At that point 
the Fed eased monetary policy sharply and the recession ended in November 1982 with 
the unemployment rate at 10 percent, inflation at 4 percent, and the interest rate on long-
term bonds near 10 percent.  
  In its opening phase, the Volcker disinflation had a recent precedent. Inflation 
declined from over 10 percent after the first oil shock to the 5 percent range in 1976, 
before it rose again. Perhaps with that recent precedent in mind, the bond market suffered 
a third inflation scare which took the 30-year bond rate from 10 percent in mid-1983 to 
over 13 percent in the summer of 1984—the bond rate was then only 1 percentage point 
below its peak in 1981 even though actual inflation was 6 percentage points lower! 
Determined to protect its gains against inflation, the Volcker Fed responded to the third 
inflation scare with an aggressive policy tightening that took the federal funds rate to 11 
percent in summer 1984. For the first time in its history, the Fed successfully employed 
interest rate policy to hold the line on inflation (at 4 percent) without creating a recession.  
  The bond rate subsequently fell by 6 percentage points to the 7 percent range by 
early 1986, indicating that the Volcker Fed had acquired credibility for 4 percent trend 
inflation. Remarkably, in light of its demonstrated determination to act against inflation 
earlier in the decade, the Volcker Fed suffered a fourth inflation scare when the 30-year 
                                                 
5 In Goodfriend and King (2005), my coauthor and I study FOMC transcripts from 1980–83 recently 
released to the public and find, surprisingly, that Volcker and other FOMC members regarded long-term 
interest rates as indicative of inflation expectations and of the credibility of their disinflationary policy. 
Using a modern consensus model of monetary policy, we argue that the real contractionary effects of the 
Volcker disinflation were mainly due to its imperfect credibility.  
  11bond rate rose by 2 percentage points between March and October of 1987. As discussed 
below, the reversal of this inflation scare under Alan Greenspan took several years.  
  The Volcker disinflation taught several lessons that are among the founding 
practical principles of the new consensus on monetary policy. First, the main monetarist 
message was vindicated: monetary policy alone—without wage, price, or credit controls, 
and without supportive fiscal policy—could reduce inflation permanently at a cost to 
output and employment that, while substantial, was far less than in common Keynesian 
scenarios. Second, a determined independent central bank can acquire credibility for low 
inflation without an institutional mandate from the government, although this “stand 
alone” central bank credibility for low inflation may be fragile and periodically tested by 
potentially destabilizing inflation scares. Third, a well-timed aggressive interest rate 
tightening can reduce inflation expectations and preempt a resurgence of inflation 
without creating a recession.  
  Alan Greenspan served as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board from 1987 to 
2006. Under Greenspan's leadership, the Fed demonstrated additional practical principles 
of monetary policy that have become part of the new consensus. The most important is 
that monetary policy could sustain low inflation with low unemployment on average, and 
with infrequent, mild recessions. The Greenspan Fed declined to announce an explicit 
target for inflation or a particular rule to describe its approach to monetary policy. But its 
monetary policy was characterized by a consistent focus on keeping inflation so low as to 
be negligible, which can be viewed as a form of implicit inflation targeting.  
  The Greenspan Fed's implicit inflation target emerged over time. Near the start of 
his term, Greenspan (1990, p. 6) sought to reinforce the Fed’s “stand-alone” credibility 
  12for low inflation with 1989 congressional testimony in which he defined the desirable 
rate of inflation as one in which “the expected rate of change of the general level of 
prices ceases to be a factor in individual and business decision-making.” By the mid-
1990s, this general desire for low inflation became more specific. The Federal Open 
Market Committee declined to adopt a formal inflation target when it debated doing so in 
January 1995 and again in July 1996. Nevertheless, there was agreement within the 
FOMC that core inflation as measured by the personal consumption expenditure deflator 
remain near 2 percent over time (Federal Open Market Committee, 1995 and 1996, 
especially, pp. 11, 63–4, 66–7, and 72). The FOMC acknowledged a lower bound on its 
implicit inflation target in May 2003 when it announced that significant further 
disinflation below the prevailing 1 percent rate of inflation would be “unwelcome.” 
Indeed, the Greenspan Fed maintained a 1 percent federal funds rate until the deflationary 
pressure passed (Broaddus and Goodfriend, 2004, p. 14, see also sections 2 and 4). 
  The Federal Reserve under Greenspan was patient in moving toward its implicit 
inflation target. In so doing, the Greenspan Fed demonstrated another practical principle 
of the new consensus: flexibility in moving inflation back to target after a shock. 
Greenspan took over as chairman during the above-mentioned inflation scare of 1987, 
when long-term interest rates on bonds were rising. However, the October 1987 stock 
market crash prevented the Fed from fighting inflation at the time and instead caused the 
Fed to supply liquidity to the banking and financial system in its role as lender of last 
resort. As a result, inflation rose to 6 percent by 1990 and the interest rate on long-term 
bonds peaked around 9 percent. Tight monetary policy in conjunction with the shock of 
the first Gulf War brought on a mild recession in 1990–91, and the inflation rate declined 
  13gradually to 3 percent in 1992. The long-term interest rate on bonds fell below 6 percent 
by the end of 1993. The loss of credibility for low inflation dating from the 1987 inflation 
scare was reversed at some cost in unemployment—the unemployment rate peaked at 7.8 
percent in June 1992 following the recession in 1990–91 before falling back to 6.5 
percent in early 1994.  
  Having nearly achieved price stability, the Greenspan Fed moved aggressively to 
defend its gains on inflation when yet another inflation scare between October 1993 and 
November 1994 lifted the 30-year bond rate by 2.5 percentage points to 8.2 percent. The 
Fed responded with a 3 percentage point increase in the federal funds rate in 1994 that 
held inflation at 3 percent with little increase in unemployment. The 1994 tightening, like 
Volcker's 1984 tightening, showed once again that aggressive, countercyclical interest 
rate policy actions can confront an inflation scare without creating a recession. The 
interest rate on long-term bonds fell back to 6 percent by January 1996. Low inflation has 
been sustained and inflation expectations have remained anchored in the United States 
since then, even though the economy grew in the 4 percent range and the unemployment 
rate fell to 4 percent during the long boom in the late 1990s.  
  The 1994 tightening brought with it a revolutionary change in how the Federal 
Reserve communicates with the public. In February 1994, the Fed began to announce its 
current federal funds rate target immediately after each Federal Open Market Committee 
Meeting, the first in a series of steps to improve communication. The Fed had managed 
interest rates secretly for most of its history (Meltzer, 2003, pp. 13, 112–16; Goodfriend, 
2003). In part, this was because the Fed earlier had lacked a coherent monetary policy 
strategy, but by 1994 it had developed a set of practical strategic and tactical monetary 
  14policy principles based on targeting low inflation. And it was increasingly difficult for the 
Fed to obfuscate interest rate policy because academics had begun to discuss Fed 
monetary policy in terms of interest rates. Expecting great scrutiny for its first tightening 
of monetary policy since 1989, the FOMC decided that it would be counterproductive to 
try to hide its current federal funds rate target from the public. In time, the public would 
come to see monetary policy through management of the federal funds rate as a 
stabilizing force for inflation, employment, and long term interest rates.  
  When a recession arrived in 2001, the Greenspan Fed illustrated yet another 
principle of the new consensus: that credibility for low inflation strengthens the power of 
monetary policy to counteract recessions. The fact that inflation and inflation 
expectations were well-anchored enabled the Fed to cut the federal funds rate 
aggressively in 2001 from 6.5 to 1.75 percent to cushion the fall in aggregate demand and 
employment. The recession from March to November 2001 was short and mild, and 
might not have been denoted a recession at all in the absence of the severe contraction in 
economic activity caused by the September 2001 attacks. 
 
International Aspects of the Consensus  
 
  Not long after the Federal Reserve under Paul Volcker demonstrated its power 
over inflation, other countries began to focus on reducing inflation. For instance, New 
Zealand and Canada famously adopted “inflation targets” in 1990 and 1991, respectively,  
as a way of bringing inflation down from previously high levels. Sweden and the United 
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system of fixed exchange rates (Liederman and Svensson, 1995). 
Emerging market economies began to adopt inflation targeting at the end of the 
decade, often following the collapse of fixed exchange rates. (Blejer, Ize, Leone, and 
Werlang, 2000) For example, Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines did so in 1998, 2000, 
and 2002, respectively, after the East Asian currency crisis of 1997. The International 
Monetary Fund accepted an inflation target as the new nominal anchor in its financial 
assistance program for Brazil in 1999 after that country's dollar peg collapsed. The IMF 
has utilized inflation targets in many of its assistance programs. Inflation targeting is 
employed today in over twenty emerging market and industrial countries (Batini and 
Laxton, 2006). 
  Most countries moved to target low inflation in an explicit, formal way. Inflation 
targeting regimes, such as those mentioned above, differ in important respects but most 
involve the following characteristics: 1) the announcement of an explicit numerical 
inflation target by the central bank, 2) patience in reversing an inflationary shock to 
minimize adverse effects on employment, 3) transparency of central bank concerns and 
intentions about the economy and interest rate policy, and 4) formal governance 
mechanisms designed to hold a central bank accountable for inflation outcomes 
(Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997; King, 2005; Svensson, forthcoming).  
  Perhaps the most prominent and economically important example of a central 
bank that relies on explicit, institutional support to sustain low inflation is the Eurosystem, 
which includes both the European Central Bank and the national central banks of the 
countries that have adopted the euro. It was launched in January 1999 to manage 
  16monetary policy in the euro area, originally composed of 11 European countries. The 
Eurosystem does not consider its policy regime as pure inflation targeting, in part because 
it also monitors money growth rates in the implementation of monetary policy. Yet, the 
Eurosystem operates under the guidance of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which 
mandates that “the primary objective of the European System of Central Banks shall be to 
maintain price stability.” The Eurosystem defines price stability as a rate of inflation 
below 2 percent but aims to maintain inflation close to 2 percent over the medium term 
(Issing, Gaspar, Angeloni, and Tristani, 2001). The Eurosystem inherited its priority for 
price stability and an operational role for money in part from the German Bundesbank, 
which had sustained relatively low inflation consistently with the help of monetary 
targets after the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in the early 
1970s. In fact, the Bank of Japan, the Bundesbank, and the Swiss National Bank all 
utilized monetary targets successfully against inflation in the 1970s, helping to encourage 
the Volcker Fed to do so a few years later (Rich, 1997; Suzuki, 1985; von Hagen, 1999). 
  Institutional support is designed to anchor inflation expectations at the inflation 
target to secure the credibility of a central bank’s commitment to low inflation 
(Gurkaynak, Levin, and Swanson, 2006). Credibility is widely regarded around the world 
as the key to effective monetary policy because it guards against inflation scares and 
improves the flexibility for monetary policy to stabilize employment over the business 
cycle. The spread of explicit or implicit inflation targeting has demonstrated its virtues. 
The new working consensus on monetary policy has helped to reduce the volatility of 
both inflation and output. In any case, there is little alternative to inflation targeting: gold 
and monetary targets have lost favor as nominal anchors for monetary policy.
 Obstfeld 
  17and Rogoff (1995) emphasize that a fixed exchange rate is no longer a viable nominal 
anchor in an era of increasingly mobile international capital.  
  Yet the shift to inflation targeting has not been free of challenges. A central bank 
could follow mechanically the rules of the gold standard or a money growth rule with 
relatively little knowledge of the economy. Under a fixed exchange rate, a central bank 
simply follows the interest rate policy of a trading partner. In contrast, for inflation 
targeting to work well, countries must build credible domestic institutions. Moreover, 
central banks must pursue an activist interest rate policy to sustain low inflation. 
Structural monetary models based on the modern theoretical consensus discussed below 
play an increasingly important role in this.
6 In fact, a robust international exchange of 
ideas, practices, and experiences has grown up to disseminate the required knowledge. 
 
Academic Advances Contributing to the Consensus 
 
  Academic advances supported the evolving consensus in monetary policy in two 
ways. Early academic work from the 1970s helped to encourage the Volcker Fed to act 
against inflation. Then, academic economists built on earlier work in the light of evidence 
generated by the Volcker disinflation to forge the components of what would become the 
consensus theoretical framework for monetary policy analysis in the 1990s. The story is 
one of mutually reinforcing advances in theory and practice.  
   The monetarist and rational expectations economists of the 1970s were influential 
not because they directly convinced Fed officials and others, but rather because they 
                                                 
6 The Federal Reserve Board’s FRB/US model is an example. Dynamic-stochastic general equilibrium 
monetary models are employed widely for policy analysis at central banks around the world.   
  18offered a way out of the inflationary chaos of the 1970s by building a plausible case that 
inflation could be tamed by monetary policy alone. As a variety of nonmonetary options 
for controlling inflation failed—including wage and price controls, credit controls, and 
fiscal policy—the monetarist option looked increasingly attractive. Thus, when the crisis 
came, the Volcker Fed implemented monetarist advice by targeting money growth more 
tightly in October 1979 and especially in 1981 to deliberately disinflate the economy 
when it judged continuing inflationary policy to involve higher long-term costs. 
  The drama and ultimate success of the Volcker era at the Federal Reserve 
stimulated ground-breaking academic advances in the analysis of money and business 
cycles. There were important advances in rational expectations econometrics, the analysis 
of real business cycles, the modeling of interest rate policy, and the modeling of the 
dynamic relationship between inflation and unemployment. Much of this progress was 
made possible by the increasing use of computers in dynamic-stochastic macroeconomic 
analysis. Although many of these advances had little practical impact at the time, they 
subsequently became the building blocks of the consensus model that emerged in the mid 
to late 1990s.  
  The foundations of the current consensus theory of monetary policy already 
reflected a degree of convergence in 1980. As reviewed by Tobin (1980), these 
foundations included the ideas that prices are marked up over costs (mainly wages); that 
price trends depend on expectations; that there is a natural rate of unemployment (where 
output equals its potential) at which wage and price setters perpetuate the going rate of 
inflation; that inflation accelerates when output is expected to exceed potential; and that 
inflation decelerates when output is expected to fall short of potential. Nevertheless, the 
  19unresolved problems were crucial ones involving how to model 1) the price and wage-
setting process, 2) expectations, 3) the transmission of monetary policy, and 4) real 
factors influencing business cycles, all in a dynamic way suitable for analyzing monetary 
stabilization policy. These problems were addressed one by one.  
  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Stanley Fischer, John Taylor, and Guillermo 
Calvo pioneered models of dynamic forward-looking wage and price setting. The model 
of staggered sticky price setting most widely used in today’s consensus models of 
monetary policy is a direct descendant of the one presented in Calvo (1983).
7  
  In his influential paper, Lucas (1976) persuaded monetary economists that it is 
critically important in modeling monetary policy to let expectations rationally reflect the 
way that monetary policy is imagined to be conducted. One key question was how to 
incorporate rational expectations so as to estimate and simulate a macroeconomic model 
suitable for policy evaluation and optimization. Taylor (1979) showed the way. In so 
doing, he quantified econometrically the inefficiency of go-stop monetary policy in terms 
of the excess volatility of output and inflation relative to his estimated efficient policy 
frontier.  
  The transmission of monetary policy was controversial in the late 1970s. Taylor’s 
(1979) model assumed that a central bank used a monetary aggregate as its policy 
instrument, which was plausible given the Volcker Fed’s focus on the monetary 
aggregates. Yet ordinarily, central banks implemented monetary policy with an adjustable 
short-term interest rate—the federal funds rate in the Federal Reserve’s case. Many 
observers, monetarists prominent among them, believed that the use of interest rate policy 
                                                 
7 Walsh (1998, pp. 218–20) provides an accessible derivation of the discrete-time “inflation equation” 
implied by Calvo's model that relates current inflation to expectations of future inflation and current output. 
  20in practice was in large part responsible for rising and volatile inflation and inflation 
expectations. Sargent and Wallace (1975) argued that the price level was indeterminate 
within a rational expectations macro model if the central bank employed a short-term 
interest rate as its policy instrument.  
  Bennett McCallum (1981) opened the door to the modern analysis of interest rate 
rules by showing that a short-term interest rate could be used as the monetary policy 
instrument if it is part of a rule which provides a nominal anchor, so that the price level is 
determinate. McCallum’s paper would lead eventually to the discussion and analysis of 
practical monetary policy in terms of interest rates in papers like Goodfriend (1991, 
1993) and Taylor (1993). In my papers, I presented some stylized facts about interest rate 
policy—that the Federal Reserve ordinarily prefers a “continuity of the short rate” and 
that federal funds rate target changes are ordinarily “highly persistent and seldom quickly 
reversed” to exert maximum leverage over longer-term rates (Woodford, 2003b). My 
1993 paper documented aggressive federal funds rate actions in response to what I 
identified as "inflation scares." The famous Taylor Rule described how the Federal 
Reserve moved the real short-term interest rate in response to the output gap and the gap 
between actual and targeted inflation. The Taylor Rule became the most common way to 
model monetary policy (Orphanides, 2007).
8 One reason the Federal Reserve began to 
talk openly about interest rate policy in 1994 was that academic economists had begun to 
do so. Indeed, thinking about monetary policy as interest rate policy is one of the 
hallmarks of the new consensus that has made possible increasingly fruitful interaction 
between academics and central bankers. 
                                                 
8 Previously, several writers including McCallum (1988) had discussed the merits of operational activist 
policy rules using the monetary base as the policy instrument.  
  21  The monetary chaos of the 1970s persuaded academic macroeconomists led by 
Kydland and Prescott (1982) and King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) to ignore money and 
monetary policy altogether in order to focus on purely real factors influencing business 
cycles such as productivity shocks, fiscal policy shocks, and international terms-of-trade 
shocks. These papers initiated a huge, highly productive literature that revolutionized the 
way that academics do macroeconomics and demonstrated, among other findings, that 
productivity shocks born of the process of economic growth cause “real business cycles” 
in models with no role for money (Prescott, 2006). Not only were such fluctuations in 
output and employment to be expected, but they were also efficient responses to 
fluctuations in productivity growth.   
  Real business cycles were studied initially in models with perfectly competitive, 
flexible prices and wages. Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) provided an important bridge 
from earlier work to the modern monetary policy consensus by analyzing what can be 
interpreted as an imperfectly competitive real business cycle model with sticky nominal 
prices and wages. Rotemberg and Woodford (1991, 1992) extended the bridge by 
exploring endogenous countercyclical markups for real business cycles in a fully 
dynamic context.   
  Much of the disarray reflected earlier in disputes between monetarist and 
Keynesian economists has been resolved in the consensus benchmark model of monetary 
policy referred to as the New Neoclassical Synthesis or New Keynesian model, the two 
names reflecting the two directions from which the convergence came. The consensus 
model incorporates classical features such as intertemporal optimization, rational 
expectations, and a real business cycle core, together with Keynesian features such as 
  22monopolistically competitive firms, staggered sticky nominal price setting, and a central 
role for monetary stabilization policy. The consensus model and its implications for 
monetary policy were presented initially in Goodfriend and King (1997) and in Clarida, 
Galí, and Gertler (1999).
9 Woodford (2003a) provides an extensive theoretical treatment, 
and my 2002 paper provides an introductory exposition of the consensus model.  
  In an intellectual irony, real business cycle models that were originally developed 
to study aggregate fluctuations independently of money and monetary policy have 
become the benchmark against which to judge optimal monetary policy in models with 
sticky prices. The idea is that optimal monetary policy should make the New Neoclassical 
Synthesis model perform as if prices were perfectly flexible, which is to say that optimal 
monetary policy should make the economy perform like its imperfectly competitive real 
business cycle core (Goodfriend and King 1997, 2001). Below, we will see how this 
important theoretical principle reinforces the priority given to price stability in practice.  
  Academic thinking also played a role in the transition from central bank secrecy 
to transparency during the past quarter century. From the perspective of monetary 
economics, a central bank had little need to communicate with the public under a gold 
standard, as long as it faithfully maintained a fixed currency price of gold. Central banks 
remained secretive after the gold standard collapsed, in part out of habit and in part 
because they lacked a coherent monetary policy strategy within which they could 
communicate productively. Today, central banks have an incentive to utilize transparency 
                                                 
9 Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) provide evidence consistent with the consensus model. Brayton, Levin, 
Tryon, and Williams (1997), King and Wolman (1996), and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) contain early 
examples of the consensus model. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), and Smets and Wouters 
(2007) are recent examples of work that embodies elements of the new consensus.  
  23and communications to facilitate an understanding of their interest rate policy actions to 
strengthen the credibility of their commitment to low inflation.  
  A large academic literature has explored the welfare effects of central bank 
information policy and generally found that transparency dominates secrecy, especially 
when a central bank operates under a credible commitment to pursue low inflation 
(Goodfriend,1986). Blinder (1996) emphasized that in a democracy, a central bank 
should be fully accountable for the policies it pursues and that transparency is necessary 
for accountability. For these and related reasons, Svensson (forthcoming) and Woodford 
(2005) emphasize that a high degree of transparency is central to the effective functioning 
of formal “inflation targeting” regimes widely employed around the world today.      
 
How Consensus Theory Supports Monetary Policy Practice 
 
  The consensus model of monetary policy reinforces four main advances in 
monetary policy arrived at in practice: the priority for price stability; the targeting of core 
rather than headline inflation; the importance of credibility for low inflation; and 
preemptive interest rate policy supported by transparent objectives and procedures. The 
theoretical support for these four features of monetary policy practice is explained below.  
 
The Priority for Low Inflation 
The consensus theory of monetary policy has at its core, monopolistically 
competitive firms that set product prices at a markup over the marginal cost of production 
(which depends on productivity and the cost of labor and materials). Because price 
  24adjustment is costly, firms consider changing their product prices only if demand and cost 
conditions threaten to compress or elevate actual markups significantly and persistently 
relative to flexible-price profit-maximizing levels. An excessively high markup yields too 
much market share to competitors, and a markup that is too low fails to exploit market 
power enough to maximize profits.  
  Firms consider raising product prices if marginal cost moves above trend because 
labor productivity (output per hour) falls below its trend, or if strong aggregate demand 
increases the intensity of resource utilization and thereby causes wage or materials costs 
to rise relative to trend. Conversely, firms consider cutting product prices if labor 
productivity rises relative to trend, or if weak aggregate demand relaxes resource 
utilization and thereby causes wage or materials costs to fall relative to trend. To sustain 
low inflation, monetary policy must manage aggregate demand taking aggregate 
productivity into account, so that marginal cost rises at the targeted rate of inflation—
then firms will raise product prices at the targeted rate of inflation because they are 
confident that doing so will keep actual markups at flexible-price profit-maximizing 
markups.  
  According to this “inflation targeting principle,” monetary policy that targets 
inflation makes the best contribution to the stabilization of output. The reasoning is this: 
1) an economy with stable inflation is one in which firms maintain their profit-
maximizing markups on average; 2) an economy in which monetary policy sustains 
profit-maximizing markups operates as if firms sustained profit-maximizing markups 
themselves by adjusting their own product prices flexibly and continuously; 3) targeting 
inflation thus makes actual output conform to potential output, where potential output is 
  25defined as the fluctuating level of aggregate output that would be determined by supply 
factors in the flexible-price, imperfectly competitive real business cycle core of the 
economy. 
  This line of argument implies that inflation targeting yields the best cyclical 
behavior of employment and output that monetary policy alone can deliver. Thus, and 
here is a revolutionary point delivered by the modern theoretical consensus—even those 
who care mainly about stabilization of the real economy can support a low-inflation 
objective for monetary policy. This point has two corollaries. First, monetary policy 
should not try to counteract fluctuations in employment and output due to real business 
cycles. Second, as an operational matter, a central bank can make the economy conform 
to its underlying real business cycle core by stabilizing inflation. The above reasoning 
suggests that if nominal wages were sufficiently flexible, there would be little if any 
short-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment because monetary policy could 
stabilize marginal cost fully by acting on wages through its influence on aggregate 
demand for goods and labor. On the other hand, monetary policy might face a trade-off in 
the presence of temporary wage rigidity, especially if a large negative productivity shock 
required an outright fall in wages (as opposed to slower wage growth) to bring marginal 
cost back down.
10 That said, ordinarily the targeted rate of inflation should be sustainable 
with positive wage growth since nominal wages grow on average at the sum of inflation 
and productivity growth.   
                                                 
10 In the context of a long-term employment relationship, a firm has the scope and incentive to utilize its 
workers efficiently, irrespective of the infrequent adjustment of nominal wages. To the extent that this is 
the case, an economy with temporarily rigid nominal wages would behave as if nominal wages were fully 
flexible (Goodfriend and King, 2001, pp. 88–91). 
  26  The above argument says nothing about why low inflation should be targeted, as 
opposed to steady inflation, but other features of the monetary economy bear on this 
point. First, inflation is inefficient because it is a tax on the use of money that causes the 
socially inefficient substitution of “shopping time” and “costly credit” for money 
balances in managing transactions. Second, given that price changes are not “indexed” to 
trend inflation when it is low, zero inflation is called for to minimize relative price 
distortions that misallocate output across goods due to staggered price adjustment among 
firms. Third, the nonindexation of the tax system causes inflation to produce additional 
distortions (Feldstein, 1997). Fourth, on the other hand, the fact that nominal interest 
rates cannot fall below zero has the potential to create problems for monetary policy that 
call for a little inflation to put a small inflation expectations premium in nominal interest 
rates. Taken together, these considerations argue for an inflation objective in the 1 to 2 
percent range found in practice.   
 
Targeting Core Rather than Headline Inflation 
Central banks such as the Federal Reserve choose implicitly or explicitly to target 
a core index of inflation that excludes volatile prices of such goods as food and oil. 
Consensus theory explains why targeting core rather than headline inflation makes sense.  
  Imagine that the economy experienced an inflationary shock to highly flexible 
prices like food or oil. If the goal was to stabilize a headline (overall) index of inflation 
that included these prices, then monetary policy would depress aggregate demand in the 
sticky-price sector and relax resource utilization there to depress wages and other costs, 
elevate markups, and induce monopolistically competitive firms to cut their prices. 
  27According to the consensus theory, that would be unnecessarily inefficient. As much as 
possible, monetary policy should make the economy operate as if all prices were fully 
flexible. That principle is achieved best by targeting core rather than headline inflation, 
and letting the economy adjust to changes in the relative prices of goods like food and oil, 
while core inflation and employment are both stabilized. Moreover, core inflation would 
be a more stable nominal anchor than overall inflation, and it would serve as a better 
anchor for inflation expectations.  
   
The Importance of Credibility for Low Inflation 
The consensus theory of monetary policy confirms in a number of ways the 
importance that central bankers attach to credibility for low inflation. First, costly price-
setting implies that firms care about expected future wage and materials costs in setting 
current prices. When an inflation-targeting regime is fully credible, firms are confident 
that inevitable departures of actual markups from flexible-price profit-maximizing 
markups will be temporary because monetary policy is expected to make them so. In 
effect, credibility for low core inflation makes beliefs of future costs in the sticky-price 
sector invariant to current shocks so that beliefs themselves anchor current pricing 
decisions to the targeted core rate of inflation. 
  Second, the absence of credibility exposes the economy to “inflation scares” by 
subjecting expectations of future marginal cost to shocks and beliefs beyond a central 
bank's control. Inflation scares create a dilemma for monetary policy. To prevent firms 
from passing higher inflation expectations through to actual inflation, a central bank must 
engineer an offsetting deflationary force by contracting demand relative to potential 
  28output, to weaken labor markets, depress wages, and elevate markups. Thus, we see why 
go-stop policy increased the volatility of both unemployment and inflation and why it is 
critical for monetary policy to preempt rising inflation. In the “go” phase of the policy 
cycle, the central bank was reluctant to act against inflation until rising inflation became 
the predominant public concern. But by then, pricing decisions embodied higher inflation 
expectations, which could only be reversed with contractionary interest rate policy.  
  Third, credibility must anchor inflation expectations so that a central bank can 
manipulate real interest rates reliably with a nominal interest rate policy instrument to 
manage aggregate demand. Furthermore, real interest rates govern only the price of 
current relative to future spending. Expected future income prospects must be anchored 
independently of monetary policy to give interest rate policy the leverage to manage 
current spending. Credibility does this by anchoring expected future markups to flexible-
price profit-maximizing markups, thereby anchoring expected future income prospects to 
productivity growth and other real business cycle factors independent of monetary policy. 
For all these reasons, credibility for targeted inflation is absolutely essential for effective 
interest rate policy. That is why it is a good idea for central banks to have strong 
institutional support to reinforce the credibility of their commitment to low inflation.  
 
Preemptive Interest Rate Policy Supported by Transparent Objectives and 
Procedures 
Consensus theory says that to stabilize inflation, interest rate policy must shadow 
the fluctuating “real natural rate of interest” that keeps actual markups at flexible-price 
profit-maximizing markups and makes aggregate demand support real business cycles. 
  29One reason why inflation targeting is technically demanding is that the natural rate of 
interest is not directly observable in markets and must be tracked with the help of a 
structural theoretical monetary model. Saying that interest rate policy should track the 
fluctuating natural rate of interest is to support the idea arrived at in practice that interest 
rate policy should preempt rising inflation, which it can do without increasing 
unemployment. From this perspective, we can understand the positive correlation 
observed in the go-stop period between higher interest rates and higher unemployment as 
an artifact of the misunderstood and mismanaged interest rate policy of the time, rather 
than as a structural feature of monetary policy. 
  Short-term interest rate policy, like moving the federal funds rate, must exert its 
leverage over current aggregate demand through its leverage over longer-term interest 
rates. According to the expectations theory of the term structure, longer-term interest 
rates move with an average of expected future short rates. Thus, to predict accurately the 
effect of an interest rate policy action on longer-term interest rates and aggregate demand, 
a central bank must create an understanding in markets as to what a given short-term 
interest rate action implies for future short rates. For this task, communication is central 
to effective interest rate policy. Rational expectations reasoning teaches that ad hoc 
announcements can reinforce but not substitute for a genuine mutual understanding 
between markets and the central bank created on the basis of an explicit, credible low-
inflation objective supported by a policy rule—a systematic articulation of how a central 
bank intends to move its short-term interest rate instrument in response to 
macroeconomic news to achieve that objective. Hence, the consensus model of monetary 
policy supports the worldwide drive to improve transparency in monetary policy practice.   
  30Conclusion 
 
  The working consensus on monetary policy still leaves plenty of unfinished 
business and scope for controversy. For instance, there is little consensus agreement 
about the nature of Japan’s deflationary monetary policy problems in the 1990s. The 
potential for deflation and the capacity of monetary policy to act against deflation—given 
that nominal interest rates cannot fall below zero—are important matters still in dispute 
(Svensson, 2003). A closely related matter is that the benchmark consensus model of 
interest rate policy has no role for “money and banking” and only a single interest rate. 
There is much to learn about how monetary policy is transmitted from the interbank 
interest rate policy instrument through the banking sector to various other interest rates 
and rates of return in the economy and on to employment and output (Goodfriend and 
McCallum, 2007). Another controversial matter involves extreme price fluctuations in 
markets for credit, equity, foreign exchange, and other assets. The benchmark consensus 
model says that asset prices should be allowed to adjust flexibly relative to targeted 
inflation. Yet the nature of extreme asset price fluctuations and the scope for monetary 
policy to deal with them are of great interest to monetary policy theorists and 
policymakers alike (Hunter, Kaufman, and Pomerleano, 2003).  
  The quantitative significance of sticky nominal price and wage adjustments for 
monetary policy are hotly debated. Extensive international evidence on sticky prices and 
wages is surveyed in this journal in Dhyne et al. (2006) and in Dickens et al. (2007). On 
one side, Golosov and Lucas (2007) argue that since monetary policy shocks cannot 
induce large or persistent real responses in their calibrated model of costly price 
  31adjustment, sticky prices are relatively unimportant. On the other side, Blanchard and 
Galí (2007) argue that the rigidity of real wages in the real business cycle core of the 
economy implies a quantitatively significant short-run trade-off between unemployment 
and inflation. 
  Among other things, no fully satisfactory theory exists to explain the loss or 
acquisition of credibility for low inflation or, similarly, how inflation scares occur, and 
the sensitivity of such phenomena to fiscal policy concerns. Models typically assume that 
a central bank follows a fully credible policy rule or that policy is purely discretionary, 
although models with learning are a prominent exception (Orphanides and Williams, 
2005). There is plenty of opportunity to improve the statistical indicators that must guide 
monetary policy, especially real-time estimates and indicators of the “natural rate of 
interest.” Finally, there is plenty of room for debate about the design of institutional 
mechanisms to support credibility for targeted inflation. 
  The worldwide progress in monetary policy is a great achievement that, especially 
when viewed from the perspective of 30 years ago, is a remarkable success story. Today, 
academics, central bank economists, and policymakers around the world work together 
on monetary policy as never before (McCallum, 2002). The worldwide working 
consensus provides a foundation for future work because it was forged out of hard 
practical lessons from diverse national experiences over decades, and because it provides 
common ground upon which academics and central bankers can work to improve 
monetary policy in the future.   
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